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ABSTRACT 
The study analyzed how independent and state media’s news programs differ in 
the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The paper analyzed what 
sources, frames and key words journalists used to describe the protest in order to 
investigate if the coverage was objective or biased in any particular direction.  
Study provides evidence that by framing protests in a different way, politicians 
and journalists give different meanings to the same issues and suggest what is at issue. 
Each party of the political elite tried to promote their own political viewpoints. By 
preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and repeating frames and 
key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported the ruling party. By 
quoting frequently reformers and their supporters and framing the event in a way offered 
by the reformers, the independent media supported the viewpoints of the reformers.  
This participatory position of the independent station is supported by 
developmental theory, which says media in countries in transition have to assist to the 
process of democracy. (Baran & Davis, 2003). In the case of Georgia, the opposition was 
considered eager to fulfill democratic reforms and so the independent media supported 
their political views.  
However, the free press theory suggests that bias is against all professional norms 
of journalism, regardless the intentions of media to have bias for the “right” side of an 
issue. (Leigh, 1974). A free press has to offer balanced and objective reports of the event 
or issue. Otherwise, it will not be credible and lose the public trust, which is most 
valuable to a free press. (Leigh, 1974). The coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the  
v 
 independent station was not beneficial to the development of a free press. It becomes 
even more obvious how important an unbiased press is now that the former reformers 
have become the government. The state TV is still maintaining the ruling party’s political 
viewpoints and the independent television became part of the government’s public 
relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and 
policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
  
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how independent and state media’s prime-time 
news programs differ in the way they framed the Georgian Revolution of Roses. The protests of 
the 2003 election outcomes in Georgia, the so-called Revolution of Roses, came at a time when 
two TV companies – state-owned “The First Channel” and independent Rustavi 2 -- were 
dramatically polarized: the state-owned station supported the point of view of the government 
and the independent station maintained the position of the opposition. The primary aim of the 
paper is to analyze what sources, frames, key words and terms journalists used to describe the 
large-scale protest in order to investigate if the coverage was fair, accurate and balanced or 
biased in any particular direction.  
Exploration of media biases is one of the important questions for contemporary Georgian 
media. “Public deliberation (reasoning and discussion about the merits of public policy) is 
essential to democracy, in order to ensure that the public’s policy preferences – upon which 
democratic decisions are based – are informed, enlightened, and authentic.” (Page, 1996, p.1).  
However, in modern societies, public deliberation is mediated, even limited, to the expression of 
the viewpoints of professional communicators – politicians, experts, journalists, etc. -- via media. 
It is extremely important for the ordinary citizen to know if the news program they are watching 
has any particular preferences regarding their news sources and the way they present the news 
event. Understanding media preferences and biases becomes especially essential during conflicts 
and crises, because people living in unstable times become dependent on the media. (Ball-
Rockeach & DeFleur, 1976).  
The study will compare the independent and state-owned media's framing of the 
revolution of Georgia; and analyze how these differences influence the final news product. 
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The key reason for the revolution was that president Eduard Shevardnadze and his party “For the 
New Georgia” tried to tamper with the 2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his 
own party had been re-elected. Opposition factions of the parliament, headed by reformers, 
insisted on canceling the official results. They, together with Georgian non-governmental 
organizations monitoring the elections, said that parallel vote counts and exit polls, which were 
showing different results, were more credible. According to those results, the opposition was the 
winner.  
Citizens of Georgia who were loyal to the opposition protested the 2003 election 
outcomes. The protests took place throughout the whole country. The revolution took as its 
symbol a red rose held by Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the protest movement, when he and 
his supporters stormed into the Parliament building. Eventually, Shevardnadze was forced to 
resign.   
State-owned TV company “The First Channel” and independent TV company Rustavi 2 
were covering the Revolution of Roses in a dramatically polarized way: the state-owned 
television company became the mouthpiece of the old regime and the independent television 
station turned out to be in the vanguard of the revolution (Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004). 
They both well illustrate the argument of Schudson (2003) about the media: “by selecting, 
highlighting, framing, shading, and shaping in reportage, they create an impression that real 
people – readers and viewers – then take to be real and to which they respond in their lives” 
(Schudson, 2003, p.2). These two TV companies created two different realities of the revolution. 
It is important to know what were the particular differences between state-owned and 
independent media in framing of the revolution and what was the general effect of it on their 
news programs. Knowing this will allow the audience to understand if any of these television 
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stations provided them with objective information, whether coverage of the revolution was fair 
and balanced, or whether the facts were biased in a favorable way for any of the opposing 
parties. 
The study is important for several reasons. In a democratic society, the exchange of 
information and ideas through the free press as well as free and open public debate is a crucial 
element of mass participation and a requirement for democratic responsiveness to public 
preferences (Sartori, 1987). Existence of a free press, which provides the citizens with objective 
information, is even more important for countries that are moving towards democracy. Georgia 
is one of them. Without this exchange of information and ideas, citizens won’t be able to 
understand fully the value or harm of particular policies or decisions of the government, and 
can’t judge virtues of political candidates and policymakers; this means they can’t make 
informed decisions regarding the policies affecting their lives, can’t take part fully in the 
political, economic and social processes of the country, can’t influence the development of the 
country and don’t have enough power to facilitate democracy.  
Researchers have indicated that journalists, reporters, commentators, experts and 
television pundits have a substantial impact upon the policy preferences of the general public 
(Page, 1996; Said, 1997; Mahnheim, 1991). So it becomes important to study media messages 
during the Revolution time. This research will allow us to begin to understand the role of the 
media during crises and social changes such as the Revolution of Roses. It is extremely 
important for Georgia, a country where democracy still is in its transition stage, since one of the 
essential conditions of successful democracy is free media as a space for public deliberation. The 
study will introduce new material to the field of Georgian media research and suggest some 
further research questions. Until recently, there have been no academic and scientific studies of 
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mass communication in Georgia except Sulkhanishvili’s (2003) and Koplatadze’s (2004) 
master’s theses. This thesis expands upon their work. The present study will help academics to 
look at some trends in the Georgian media environment, using the example of the most polarized 
and most-watched television companies. The results of the study can provide some evidence for 
future research.  
This research also will help professionals in the field to understand how sources and their 
own cultural or social biases can influence the outcome of the news. Journalists can determine if, 
as Mindich (1998) suggests, a responsible journalist has to offer something more than passive 
“objectivity.” He proposes that journalists can interpret reality, not just transmit pure facts, but 
they have to explain how they interpret reality and why the public should believe them. 
The study will provide common citizens with knowledge of what kind of news programs 
they watch and how news is packaged. This will help them to be aware of the differences 
between state-owned and private television. They will have a clearer understanding of whether 
watching the news programs provided by either of the TV channels enable them to receive 
objective, fair and balanced information. They will be more aware of whether they need to take 
steps to ensure they receive “a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's 
events in a context which gives them meaning;” (Leigh, 1974, p. 21). The audience will 
understand how the media present and clarify the goals and values of society during a crisis; they 
can see if the media are a forum for free and open debate or are limited to the specific political or 
economical preferences of their owners and reporters. This, in turn, will help them make more 
informed and enlightened decisions regarding policymakers and policies.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Political Background 
 
Georgia, one of the former republics of Soviet Union, declared independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze became the president of Georgia in 1995, following 
the first president, Zviad Gamsaxurdia, who ruled the country from 1992-95. Shevardnadze was 
well-known and popular in the West for his role in helping dismantle the former Soviet Union 
and the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, when he was the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Soviet 
Union. In Georgia his ruling style was known as a “balancing style of governance” that refers to 
his ability to balance two opposing factions of the parliament – the old communist bureaucracy 
and the new generation of Western- oriented politicians who called for reforms. The old 
communist bureaucracy controlled all law enforcement and security agencies. The reformers 
demanded radical changes in the political and economic life of Georgia, the abandoning 
communist-styled governing and the reforming of law enforcement agencies to protect civil 
rights.  
The conflict between these two factions became stronger in 1998-2000, when the 
reformers declared that the president and his associates were unable to lead the country toward 
democracy, and that instead of making the reforms, the country was facing rising levels of 
corruption in almost every sphere of political and economic development. They formed a radical 
opposition: “The National Movement” party led by parliament member Mikheil Saakashvili, and 
“Burjanadze-The Democrats” party lead by speaker of the parliament Nino Burjanadze and 
parliament member Zurab Jvania.   
 5
  
The president was no longer able to maintain the balance. He changed the name of his 
party from “Citizen’s Union” to “For the New Georgia” and began promoting the party for the 
2003 parliamentary elections.   
In addition to the three main political parties -- “For the New Georgia,” “The National 
Movement” and “Burjanadze – The Democrats” - there were four other political parties that were 
relatively popular among the citizens of Georgia: The New Rights, The Labor Party, Industry 
Will Save Georgia and Revival Party. These parties were somewhat represented in the Georgian 
parliament after 1995. Reformers often refer to these parties as allies of the ruling party and not 
real opposition (Khoperia, 2003). Other small parties, such as Greens, Unity, etc. were such 
small parties that they were not considered to be competitive.   
The elections of 2003 became critical for the country. The popular consensus was that the 
president’s party was to blame for corruption, poverty and impediment of the country’s 
development. "There were two truly unusual things about this election," said Tinatin Khidasheli,  
president of the Young Lawyers Association, one of the non-governmental organizations 
monitoring the elections. (Antelava, 2003, p.1).  "One is that this is the first time that Georgia's 
people had a choice, a genuine choice - not between various pro-governmental parties, but 
among real opposition parties who have different agendas. And also the voter turnout was 
incredibly high." (Antelava, 2003, p.1).  
President Shevardnadze and his party “For the New Georgia” tried to tamper with the 
2003 parliamentary elections and make it appear that his own party had been re-elected. Since 
1995, when Shevardnadze became president of Georgia, the country had gone through two civil 
wars and was in a deep political, economic, and social crisis. It was hardly a surprise that 
eventually the issue of election tampering would be seen as another failure of Shevardnadze and 
 6
  
his ruling party to respect its citizens. Protests of 2003 election outcomes turned into calls for the 
resignation of Shevardnadze and his government. (Sulkhanishvili, 2003). At the end of the 
Election Day, 2nd November, the National Movement Party and their supporters gathered in the 
Griboedov Theater. They installed a big screen in order to show the independent television 
station’s news program, which transmitted results of the exit polls and parallel vote count 
organized by international companies and the Georgian non-governmental organization “Fair 
Elections.” According to these organizations, the National Movement party was the winner. 
While the party was celebrating its victory, members of Shevardnadze’s party “For the New 
Georgia” began saying that the official results of the elections were different and that “For the 
New Georgia” had won the elections. “You’ll see it tomorrow,” said one of the leaders of “For 
the New Georgia” on a live talk show on the independent station. (Khoperia, 2003).  
The next day the National Movement party began organizing protests alleging election 
tampering in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. The Central Election Committee publicized 
preliminary results of the elections. According to the CEC, the president’s party was re-elected.  
The “Burjanadze – the Democrats” party formed an alliance with the National Movement party 
and joined the protests. The alliance called for widespread protests all over the country. Citizens 
of Georgia living in the regions led by Saakashvili organized long protest caravans and gathered 
in the capital.  
By the 23rd of November, several thousand people gathered in front of parliament calling 
for the resignation of Shevardnadze. Despite the objections of the National Movement party, 
Burjanadze – The Democrats, Georgian non- governmental organizations monitoring the 
elections, international observers, and others, Shevardnadze tried to organize the first meeting of 
his new parliament. Saakashvili, the leader of the National Movement party, and his supporters 
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stormed the parliament building carrying red roses as a symbol of non-violence and insisted on 
the resignation of the president. Shevardnadze’s bodyguards had to escort the president out of the 
parliament building. At the end of the day, Saakashvili and Jvania, a leader of  Burjanadze - The 
Democrats, went to visit Shevardnadze at his home and received an official letter of the 
president’s resignation signed by Shevardnadze. After the president stepped down, the speaker of 
the parliament Burjanadze canceled the results of the 2003 elections and declared new elections 
would be held in early 2004. Mikheil Saakashvili and a new generation of Western-oriented 
reformer politicians came to power. Saakashvili became president.  
The Western and local media considered it a crucial step toward democratic changes in 
Georgia. “The Rose Revolution represented a victory not only for the Georgian people but also 
for democracy globally. The revolution that took as its symbol a red rose demonstrated that, by 
aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and 
applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic 
kleptocracy” (Lincoln, 2004, p.347). Experts consider television to be one of the most important 
media for the protest leaders during the revolution (Devdariani, 2004). In particular, researchers 
refer to the independent television company Rustavi2. The station’s coverage of the protests was 
almost nonstop. They often invited opposition leaders and their supporters and provided them 
with unlimited opportunity to express their viewpoints. The protest leaders used this time to 
inform Georgians about upcoming demonstrations and actions (Lincoln, 2004). “The station 
always showed images of demonstrators tightly packed together, shying away from aerial shots 
that might have shown that the protesters were crowded in a relatively small space. Rustavi 2’s 
image of the vigil differed just enough from reality to give viewers the impression that there 
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really was a mass movement actively supporting Saakashvili and the opposition.” (Lincoln, 
2004, p.345)  
Media Development  
 
During the period of the Communist regime in Georgia (1921-91), the First Channel was  
 
state-owned and fully controlled by the state. Television broadcasting was in its authoritarian  
 
phase; the government completely dominated the media for the purpose of forcing those media to  
 
serve the ruling communist party (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). Censorship was the  
 
natural everyday practice of media professionals. “Much of the Soviet Union's seven-decade  
 
existence saw an extreme example of highly organized communication control. Media  
 
constraints were so centralized and thorough that serious alternatives to the official line of the  
 
ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on even a small scale, did not exist.” (Gibbs, 1999,  
 
p.3). At the end of the Communist period, during “perestroika” (economic restructuring) and  
 
“glastnost” (openness to criticism of the Soviet government), Mikhail Gorbachev’s government  
 
was in the forefront of change. Gorbachev aggressively promoted glastnost as a component of  
 
his reconstruction of Soviet economics. Gibbs (1999) argues that he started to use the media in  
 
order to overcome controversy within the party and affirm his own reforms. He accomplished  
 
this by allowing critiques of the government to appear in the media of that period. “Of new  
 
contents and topics permitted under glastnost, Gorbachev was most approving of those which  
 
favored the reform course or which highlighted problems associated with his political  
 
adversaries… Gorbachev was highly sensitive to media use he considered counter-productive to  
 
his aims.” (Gibbs, 1999, p.89). Thus, Gorbachev’s conditional reform broadened the public and  
 
mass media discussion of selected topics, but still monitored the process carefully. There was no  
 
more official body censoring the media, but there was an unwritten agreement between the  
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media and Gorbachev on which issues could be made public and which could not, which  
 
practices media could criticize and which were taboo. The control was less severe than  
 
censorship, but it still existed.  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when independence returned to Georgia, 
the Georgian press had almost every feature of the libertarian press (Bokeria, Targamadze & 
Ramishvili, 1997). Along with the state-owned television channel some private-owned channels 
were established. Many different news programs were created. Some of the TV news programs 
and especially their weekly analytical editions, mostly aired live, were creating the venues for 
fair debate. “In the last few years, particularly starting in the spring of 1997, certain changes 
have taken place that show the process of democratic development is entering a new phase,” 
wrote Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute, a non-governmental organization 
protecting civil rights and freedom of the press. “The development of civil society requires more 
publicity in public life. The media is doing its part to end the problem of an under-informed 
society by presenting diverse viewpoints and forming an open system of disseminating 
information” (Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997, p.29). Thus, a free marketplace of ideas 
was created.  
Developmental theory serves as a good description of Georgian media in the late 1990s 
(Baran & Davis, 2003). This theory says that when a nation is in transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a well-established democracy, and its economic development is low, media must be 
more supportive than critical of their government. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Journalists should 
help the government to promote development of the country. The development concept describes 
systems in which government and media work together to guarantee successful development of a 
given nation. (Baran & Davis, 2003). Hence the successful development of the country was not 
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associated with the government of Georgia and President Shevardnadze, but with the reformers 
and the media allied with them that supported their positions.  
 Since the late ‘90s Georgian media has quoted mostly oppositional sources. Koplatadze 
(2004) studied frames in Georgian media in the coverage leading up to the 2003 elections. He 
found that the Georgian press cited the opposition and used antigovernment key words that 
indicate that opposition influenced the news construction more than the government (Koplatadze, 
2004).  
However, the Georgian government still had certain mechanisms to manipulate the 
independent media. “Although the state monopoly on printing and distribution, which presented 
a powerful mechanism for control of the press, is gone, there are other significant levers in the 
hands of the authorities, for instance, lawsuits against the media.” (Bokeria, Targamadze & 
Ramishvili, 1997, p. 19). Georgian media are more vulnerable to lawsuits than Western media, 
because the government has more influence on judges than governments in the West and can 
ensure a favorable outcome. Also, the tax police have strong powers and can paralyze the 
activities of media that are under inspection. “Investigation of economic violation” was the 
official reason given by the Georgian government when the Investigative Department of the 
Ministry of National Security tried to paralyze the broadcasting of the most popular independent 
TV Channel Rustavi 2 in 2001 (Sulkhanishvili, 2003).  
Mass demonstrations took place in Tbilisi. Citizens tried to support the channel and thus  
 
defend a free press. The leaders of the Revolution of Roses called the protests in defense of a  
 
free press in 2001 a general rehearsal for the revolution; the nationwide protests in November,  
 
2003 were carried out in order to defend the right of the citizen to elect their favorite candidates  
 
in a free and objective election process.   
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Theoretical Background 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine the differences, if any, in the coverage of the 
 
Revolution of Roses by the state-owned television and independent Georgian television. This  
 
study employs theoretical perspectives derived from framing and indexing theories.  
 
Framing Theory. The process by which the political players and also media professionals 
and audiences define and give meaning to issues and connect them to a larger political 
environment has come to be known as framing (Entman, 1993). The theory is essential to the 
present study, because by looking at the presence and absence of certain frames the researcher 
will be able to examine the differences, if any, in news stories aired on the state-owned and 
private-owned television companies.  
The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman’s (1974) seminal work. The underlying 
presumption was that the organization of messages affects the viewers’ subsequent thoughts and 
actions. In general, framing involves the organization and packaging of information. Gamson 
and Modigliani (1987) make this point clear when they say frames are the "central organizing 
idea or storyline that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) or "a central 
organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989, p. 57). Their general idea is that a frame is a useful discursive device that 
helps professional communicators in constructing the meaning of an event or an issue and 
channels the audience toward desirable understanding of it. (Gitlin, 2003). Framing is "the 
process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political 
issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue" (Nelson, Oxley, & 
Clawson, 1997a, p. 222). Nelson and his colleagues (1997b) provide the best, most 
comprehensive common definition, and the one that shows the way toward linking framing and 
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deliberation. In other words, "framing is the process by which a communication source … 
defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy" (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997b 
p. 567). This definition points to the heart of framing - the construction of political, social, 
economic and other important issues. This idea of associations is critical to understanding 
framing. A model of framing can be built on the premise that to frame a message in a given way 
entails certain associations rather than others. For example, Georgian newspapers’ coverage of 
the 2003 elections provided substantial background for the opposition parties. “By stressing 
government responsibility, the media facilitated oppositional parties’ efforts to spread their anti-
governmental messages, to reduce trust in government, and hence to succeed in supporters’ 
mobilization across the country.” (Koplatadze, 2004, p.35). 
“Frames define the problem, diagnose its cause, offer and justify treatments for the 
problem and predict their likely effects” (Entman, 1993, p.52). Evidence suggests the power of 
frames to shape a citizen’s policy support and related political perceptions (Callaghan & Schnell, 
2001; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nelson et al., 1997b). Political elites can effectively use frames to 
promote their own political ends. And by repeating or neglecting certain frames suggested by 
politicians, the media either promote or prevent from promoting certain political ends of 
politicians. This study will look at what kind of frames the independent television station’s news 
program and the news program of the state-owned television station chose. It will examine 
whether the choice of certain frames promoted the political goals of the government or its 
opposition.  
One of the important findings of Koplatadze’s (2004) study is that the government 
responsibility frame dominated the Georgian press of the period leading up to the 2003 elections. 
This, together with frequent usage of anti-governmental sources and keywords, indicates that the 
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opposition influenced the news construction much more than the government. He said that media 
of that period not only selected the issue and shaped it favorably to the opposition, but also 
identified the directions of the responsibility for the cause of the problem (Koplatadze, 2004). 
 Indexing Theory.  A massive amount of scholarly work (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; 
Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974) shows that even when citizens do engage in democratic practices, 
want to be informed and therefore pay attention to political news, they are often, whether 
politically educated or not, under the influence of the media and other political actors who 
dominate the news discourse. The indexing theory takes as a basic assumption the need of 
journalists to quote authoritative sources and argues that as a result, news outputs are a function 
of “official” views on a given issue. (Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996). Reporters index their 
coverage of the range of opinion that exists in the government (Bennett, 1990). If the points of 
view of the authoritative sources are dominant in media, public discussion can be highly 
dependent on the discursive behavior of political elites. Zaller (1992) and Entman (1993) 
maintain that the positions of elite political actors in and out of government define the key 
parameters and points of reference in discussion and thought for media and citizens alike. Thus, 
these scholars present a ‘top down’ view of the relationship between elite discourse and mass 
opinions. Exactly such elite discourse was dominant in Georgian media in 2001-2003 years. 
(Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze, 2004).  
Bennett (1990) and Lawrence (2000) found that dramatic, unsettling news events could 
provide journalists with story material while encouraging them to seek out sources that can 
contextualize those events. However, according to the theory of indexing, reporters use non-
political sources for strengthening the agenda of the political elite (Bennett, 1990). The 
Revolution of Roses was providing journalists with exactly such unsettling and dramatic news 
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events. Georgian media of that period could seek out not only sources from political elite of the 
country, but also from independent experts, ordinary citizens, etc. to provide broad 
understanding of the revolution. This study will examine if the reporters referred to non-political 
sources for strengthening certain positions of the political elite. The second rule formulated by 
Bennett (1996) involves keying a story to disagreements among officials – particularly officials 
with the power to affect the outcome of the developing news event. Such conflict serves as a 
signal for journalists to expand a story to include the views of experts, social groups, opinion 
polls and other sources that reflect the observed differences between powerful politicians. 
A study conducted by Kim and Weaver (2003) found results similar to the indexing 
theory results. The authors compared news sources in five different countries in 1997 during the 
Asian economic crisis. They found that news reporters in all five countries used routine source 
channels – press conferences, official proceedings or press releases - more than informal ones – 
informal leaks, unofficial interviews, etc. They also found that news reporters quoted more elite 
news sources, executives, decision-makers or spokespersons than employees and unaffiliated 
individuals. This study is important to the present study of news sources used by two different 
Georgian television companies from the perspective of the indexing theory. The current study 
will examine whether the Georgian media also indexed news sources to the political elite rather 
than ordinary citizens. 
Scholars agree that politicians and interest groups try to control the shape and tone of the 
debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to their political interests (Molotch  
& Lester, 1975). “Control over political rhetoric is an essential tool to influence public opinion.” 
(Callaghan & Schnell, 2001, p.184). That a party or politician is the winner in the discussion 
about a certain policy, which can guide the discussion in a certain direction by means of inserting 
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certain terms regarding the issue (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). This is the reason why interest 
groups are eager to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can 
increase an issue’s visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group’s 
favor (Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). This is the reason that political parties or 
certain politicians prefer certain newspapers or television companies regarding the four crucial 
criteria: easy access, a large audience, high credibility and control of the final product (Cook, 
1989). This means that the politicians look for coverage in such newspapers, television and radio 
companies, which have high ratings, are considered credible and believable and are loyal to those 
politicians. Loyalty to a certain politician or a political party more likely guarantees that the 
newspaper, television or radio station is eager to have quotes of their favorites more often than 
the quotes of less sympathetic politicians and thus, provide their favorites with easy access to the 
news outlet. This, in turn, means that the politician will more likely be able to insert his language 
– terms and symbols -- into a news story and have the opportunity to convey the message in a 
favorable way.  This study will scrutinize the language of Georgian media in the coverage of the 
protest.  
Scholars argue that media too have their own professional standards and commercial and 
ideological interests, and in the final stage of production the media itself can have a “media-
constructed” version of reality (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974; Tuchman, 1972). Blumler and 
Gurevitch (1974) discriminate two media models: symbiotic and adversary. They described the 
adversary model as a model based on the conflict of interests between politicians and media. 
“Politicians should be carefully watched when they abuse their power, exceed their mandates, 
commit blunders they would prefer to conceal, and elevate themselves to positions of non-
accountable authority.” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1974, p. 470). The authors say that the media has 
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symbiotic relations with political actors if there is a reason and possibility of bargaining (Blumler 
& Gurevitch, 1974). They provide politicians with access to the public via media in exchange for 
information. 
Based on Koplatadze’s (2004) findings about the adversary position of Georgian media 
during election 2003 coverage toward President Shevardnadze, we might expect the same 
tendency to occur regarding the private-owned TV station. Taking into consideration literature 
on state-owned media (Siebert et al., 1956, Gibbs, 1999) we might also expect that state TV will 
have a symbiotic relationship with the existing government of the country.   
Empirical Evidence 
 
The few scholarly works regarding Georgian media mostly examine general development  
 
of a free media system and are less specific in analyzing its particular message strategies (Jones,  
 
2000; Lincoln, 2004; Devdariani, 2004; Bokeria, Targamadze & Ramishvili, 1997).  
Jones (2000), Lincoln, (2000) and Devdariani (2004) give an overview of Georgia’s 
political development from the perspective of establishing the democratic state and mention 
Georgian media briefly as an active player in the process. Bokeria and his colleagues (1997) 
present data on Georgian media, their infrastructure, give an overview of the law regarding the 
media, and give examples of media restraints enacted by the government of Georgia. These 
articles are based mostly on interviews with politicians, media representatives, experts and 
interest groups (Jones, 2000), existing political data and personal observations (Devdariani, 
2004, Lincoln, 2004). Bokeria and colleagues collect more comprehensive data on Georgian 
media, but none of the articles study in depth media production and news programs in particular.  
They address more general economic, political and legal frameworks of Georgian media, rather 
than analyze any particular media product.  
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However, some works can be found that scrutinize frames and sources or general 
characteristics of different types of media in the post-Soviet region.  For example, Romania, 
Russia and Poland, like Georgia, are countries that underwent similar development from 
communist autocracies toward established democracies. Hypothetically, it may be true that 
media in these countries have some similar characteristics.  
For example, Gross (1999) gives six characteristics of Romanian media in 1996-2000 
that resemble some characteristics of Georgian media. As Gross (1999) argues, the media and 
journalists generally fail to serve as models of democratic beliefs and values. He claims that 
“journalism (a) contributes to suspicions about democracy; (b) often increases rather than 
decreases the intolerance for opposing parties, beliefs and preferences; (c) does not contribute to 
an atmosphere that increases willingness to compromise with political opponents or that 
enhances pragmatism and flexibility; (d) increases mistrust of the political environment and 
cooperation; (e) does nothing to encourage moderation in political position and partisan 
identification or civility in political discourse; and (f) contributes little to political efficiency and 
participation” (Gross, 1999, p. 23). 
 Lipman and McFaul (2001) studied how the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, treated 
the independent Russian media, and in particular the television company NTV. They analyze 
Putin’s actions and speeches from the perspective of understanding the concept of free and 
independent press. They also describe the NTV coverage of the Chechen War and parliamentary 
and presidential elections in Russia to provide a better understanding of the context and 
background of Putin’s reactions. In Russia, as in many emerging democracies, independent press 
often became a synonym for oppositional press (Gross, 1996, Coman, 2000). This happened to 
the independent television company NTV. NTV’s director general, Igor Malashenko, crossed the 
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border between political campaigning and media when he became one of the members of then-
president Boris Yeltsin’s reelection team without resigning from his television post. He 
encouraged the television company to give positive coverage to Yeltsin and very critical 
reporting of the leader of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov, the opposing candidate 
during the campaign. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The researchers see the partisanship of 
Russian media as an effort toward “keeping communists out of power” and “protecting their 
survival as an independent media.” (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, p.119). The authors conclude that 
because of the nonexistence of an independent judiciary system or popular support of a free 
Russian press, the effort of one TV company was not enough to protect the right of free speech 
and Putin was able to control private Russian media.  
   Goban-Klas (1997) emphasized a similar inclination in Polish media. He argues that 
media in Poland is partisan and this partisanship reflects inherent social tensions and competing 
political groups’ perceptions that in the struggle for power media have become “the main 
instrument for politics. Their vision of the media is one-dimensional, over-politicized and 
simplified, believing in a missionary role for journalists and an ideologized press.” (Goban-Klas, 
1997, p. 37).  
  The importance of political elite news sources is stressed in Ellis’s (1999) study of 
Russian media. The author argues that “the primary function of mass media in Russia is not to 
attract and hold large audiences for advertisers, but to attract and hold large audiences for 
individual politicians, who either control or strive to control the mass media.” (Ellis, 1999, 
p.104). This particular finding is important to the present study, because during the Revolution of 
Roses, it was extremely important for politicians to have the support of citizens and their best 
tool for this was the Georgian private media (Lincoln, 2004, Devdariani, 2004).  
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The results of monitoring Russian television news during the campaign periods for the 
1995 Duma campaign and the 1996 presidential race show that state-owned and privately-owned 
TV companies generally failed to contribute fully to the legitimization of the electoral process 
(Oates & Roselle, 2000). During the parliamentary campaign, state-controlled Russian Public 
Television (ORT) focused on pro-government parties and neglected coverage of the competition. 
Although the election coverage on the private NTV station was more balanced, the elections 
were relatively ignored in favor of aggressive coverage of the war in Chechnya. By the 1996 
presidential election, the two stations both abandoned the pretense of neutrality to promote the 
presidential candidacy of Boris Yeltsin. “What emerges from this study is evidence of a missed 
opportunity to consolidate the growth of an independent media in Russia—and the failure of 
voters to obtain disinterested information from primary television outlets in a fragile 
democracy.” (Oates & Roselle, 2000, p.30). The present study will examine if the same path 
occurred regarding Georgian TV companies.  
The reason for the weak role of Russian media in facilitating the process of democracy is 
that the development of social groups and organizations, especially political parties and interest 
groups, is very fragmented and fragile. (Symon, 2004; Skyner, 2003). They were unable to create 
strong opposition voices. This absence of a strong opposition made it difficult for the Russian 
media to find opposition voices to balance the point of view of Putin and to maintain the freedom 
of expression in Russian media. That is why the Russian media tend to present favorable images 
of the president and his majority party in the Parliament (Skyner, 2003, Symon, 2004).  
In Georgia, on the contrary, civil society and free media are allied, and whenever the 
media is in trouble, civil society tries to support it. For example, when the government attempted 
to close down the independent television company Rustavi2 in 2001, Georgian civil society 
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created street protests and tried to protect freedom of expression (Sulkhanishvili, 2003). On the 
other hand, knowing that its very existence depended on a strong civil society, the independent 
media promoted the values of a strong civil society. For example, Koplatadze’s (2004) study of 
election 2003 coverage in Georgian media concludes that both journalists and reformers 
understood that fabrication of the election would weaken the establishment of democracy in 
Georgia. They were aware that only a united effort by the media and civil society could stop the 
government from fabricating the election. The researcher said that this was the reason why a 
symbiotic relationship was formed between the media and the opposition.  The peaceful 
resignation of President Shevardnadze indicated that their goal was achieved (Koplatadze, 2004).   
The present study will test the following four hypotheses: 
H1a: The prime-time stories on the news program of the state-owned television company 
had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than from the 
reformers.  
H1b: The prime-time stories on the news program of the private-owned television 
company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from 
the ruling party. 
These hypotheses are derived from the indexing theory that suggests that the media is 
indexing its sources to the political elite. (Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1974; Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 1996).  The state-owned media repeats the position of the 
government and the independent media strengthens the position of the opposition (Oates & 
Roselle, 2000).     
H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and 
terms than pro-reform keywords. 
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H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than 
pro-government keywords. 
The indexing theory also suggests that politicians and several interest groups try to 
control the shape and tone of the debates, because they want to structure outcomes favorable to 
their political interests (Callaghan et al., 2001). This is the reason why interest groups are eager 
to insert their language and symbols into media coverage of an issue, which can increase an 
issue’s visibility, salience and potentially incline the political balance in a group’s favor 
(Kollman, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). 
H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.   
Framing theory suggests that by framing, journalists are giving meaning to an issue. 
Journalists are presenting different realities by providing different highlights, different selections 
of sources, issues, stories and pictures (Entman, 1993; Schudson, 2003).  
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
In order to analyze how Georgian independent and state-owned media’s prime time news 
programs differed during the period of crisis in the country, the researcher used a content 
analysis. According to Kellinger (1986), a content analysis enables the researcher to study 
“communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring 
variables” (Kellinger in Wimmer & Dominick, 2000, p.135). This study employs a descriptive 
content analysis rather than an inferential one, because of the small number of the news stories; 
there were 250 prime-time news stories aired on the two TV programs during the protests, so it 
was feasible to study the entire universe of stories and sampling was not necessary. The 
descriptive content analyses also are “reality checks, whereby portrayal of groups, phenomena, 
traits, or characteristics are assessed against a standard taken from real life…. Moreover, 
descriptive content analyses sometimes serve as a prelude to other types of research, often in 
domains not previously explored” (Riffe, 1998, p.10). The method is best for the research 
questions because Georgian media and in particular its behavior during the protests are not well-
researched fields, and descriptive content analysis can help assess the situation by applying 
standard indicators to the behavior of TV companies in this particular case.  
Several important factors determine the choice of news programs of the state-owned and 
one of the independent television stations. The President of Georgia and his election bloc “For 
New Georgia” together with the opposition parties constantly accused the independent television 
of framing the event in a certain way (Shengelia, November 2003; Khoperia, 2003). 
Shevardnadze and his counterparts were blaming this television for being a mouthpiece for the 
reformers (Shengelia, November 2003). They said that independent television showed and 
quoted only governmental opposition. Nobody had any kind of arguments against two other 
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independent television companies: Imedi TV and Mze. The reformers accused state television of 
being a puppet in the hands of Shevardnadze (Khoperia, 2003). They said that state-owned 
television showed and quoted only the president and his supporters (Khoperia, 2003). The study 
is interested in examining these television stations because of the degree of polarized attitudes 
towards them. The selection of these two TV stations gives us a good possibility to analyze what 
degree of access each TV company granted to the sources, and if they give the sources the 
possibility to control the final product. Also, television news is more likely than other media to 
assist citizens in forming opinions on the candidates and the issues (Hennessey, 1985), and more 
so during crisis, when demand for simultaneous information is high and citizens are more likely 
to depend on media. (Ball Rockeach & DeFleur, 1976). The private TV company, afterwards, in 
its promotional ads referred to itself as “the television of winners.” 
The study covers 44 prime-time news programs aired in the evening hours, generally 
between 7 and 11 P.M., when the largest television audience is available, between the 2nd and 23rd 
of November 2003. Elections took place on 2nd of November 2003. This was also the date when 
Georgian reformers, their supporters and non-governmental organizations started to protest the 
results of voting. The 23rd of November was the date when the old government was replaced by 
the reformers. Because of the nature of the prime-time news programs, each TV company tried 
to air what was, in their opinion, the most important and interesting information. So it is a good 
possibility to look at the news sources and event frames in these programs in order to see what 
the preferences of each newscast were.  
The unit of analysis of the present study is the news story. All stories from 22 state-
owned station’s news programs and from 22 news programs of the independent television station 
were analyzed. In order to examine what kind of sources reporters used and how they used them, 
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the researcher reduced the categories of sources into the supporters of the president and his party 
and the supporters of the opposing  “National Movement” and “Burjanadze - the Democrats” 
parties and their allies. Other factions were eliminated because they were less influential and not 
competitive during the studied period. The first group includes President Eduard Shevardnadze, 
Prime Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, active representatives Irine Sarishvili, Levan Mamaladze, 
Vitali Khazaradze, plus any local, foreign expert, media representative, ordinary citizen, etc. that 
expressed the view of the bloc For New Georgia - that elections were fair and the protests were 
organized not for justice, but for the demands of certain politicians who wanted power or were 
interested in creating destabilization in the country. The supporters of reform include sources 
from the representatives of reformers: Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Jvania and 
Koba Davitashvili, plus non-governmental organizations, media, experts, and anybody who 
expressed their view that the results were not fair and that the government violated the rights of 
voters.   
The researcher also identified keywords for each side of the event, based on terms 
appearing frequently in news stories. The terms used to involve frames and keywords in this 
study constituted frequent words, phrases and themes identified by the researcher in a close 
reading of the texts. The following keywords were determined as pro-governmental:  
1) “Manipulated people”- This term is often used for blaming certain politicians for 
manipulating the public to protest government, using the public to achieve their political ends, 
and therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. It refers to the idea that people would 
not protest the results of the Central Election Committee on their own and  would only do so if 
someone made them do so. An example is: “A small amount of manipulated people are gathering 
in front of the Parliament;” “Jvania is using young people to achieve his goals.” 
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2) “Civil war/bloodshed/chaos/destabilization” – Terms are used to identify 
demonstrations and people gathering as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. The 
opposition is accused of splitting Georgian public into two adversary groups who will defend 
themselves by means of arms, and bloodshed will be inevitable. Each appearance of these words 
should be coded. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We 
don’t want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.” 
3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - Oppositional politicians were accused of 
opposing the government and the results of the election because their motivation was to take 
power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd November because he wants 
to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him, the results of the Central 
Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the Parliament.” 
4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections/Fair elections 
since Shevardnadze” - Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair, 
but had some minor violations that did not affect the final outcome.  Example: “Despite the 
minor violations, in whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past 
years.” 
5) Call for negotiation and agreement - The president often stressed that he was eager to 
meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stressed that 
despite his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was 
waiting for Jvania and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show up.” 
6) Other – the researcher tried to include every key word or the key term in analyses, but 
to avoid missing something the coding sheet had this category to specify if there was any 
keyword or term that did not match the above-mentioned categories.  
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The sources were defined as follows: 
Supporters of the ruling party includes only those celebrities, official representatives of 
foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements 
supporting the ruling party. 
Supporters of the reformers include only those celebrities, official representatives of 
foreign countries, local and foreign experts, local and foreign media who/which made statements 
supporting the reformers. More specific categories are explained in detail in the code book 
created for the present study. See appendix B. 
During the close watching of the programs, the researcher found that the reformers 
frequently used the following keywords and phrases:  
1) Worthy people: opposition used the term to say that people taking part in 
demonstration are worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity, and their 
dignity was defined as a right to vote and a right to have a better life. “Georgians are worthy 
people. They won’t let the government ignore their choice.”  
2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest: supporters of opposition often used the 
term to define manifestations and demonstrations against the government as the will of people 
who were defending their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian 
people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend 
their voice.” The protests were often defined as a peaceful way of changing the government. 
Example: “Our protest is peaceful. We will stand firm, but peacefully;” “The Georgian people 
thought that the elections were the means of replacing the government peacefully. Shevardnadze 
ignored this. He is ignoring the demands of Georgian people. We don’t want to have such 
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government. Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing 
government.” 
3) Fair battle: opposition and their supporters defined demonstrations as a fair battle for 
defense of the right to vote and fair results of elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to defend 
our voices.” 
4) Falsification of elections/election lists/Violation of election rights: the news coverage 
during this period was mainly concerned with the results of the elections. Many sources were 
claiming that elections were dramatically falsified and this very falsification was the reason that 
people went out into the streets. Example: “It is evident that the results of the elections are totally 
fabricated in order to falsify the elections.” Often the protesters said Shevardnadze and the 
alliance For the New Georgia violated the rights of voters to ensure their own victory. Example: 
“Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and by doing so, 
his party obtained the first place.” 
5) “Necessity for the government’s resignation:” This phrase was mostly used by 
opposition sources to claim that there was no way for the government to stay in power and it 
must resign. This term stresses high responsibility for the government in the conflict. Example: 
“The Georgian people could stand the cold, the dark, the starvation, but it could not stand the 
violation of its dignity. The Government has no right to stay in power. We demand its 
unconditional resignation.” 
6) Other: In regard to avoid missing any key words in favor of protesters and against the 
government and was not included in the above-mentioned categories, here the coders specify it.  
Four dominant frames were used that were identified in previous framing studies 
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). They are: responsibility, conflict, human interest and economic 
 28
  
consequences frame. The recent studies of Georgian media (Sulkhanishvili, 2003; Koplatadze, 
2004) indicated that morality frame was not typical in Georgian media, so they were not 
considered as an important frame for the present study. For identifying the correct frame, each 
sentence within each news story was coded.   
The responsibility frame portrayed an issue or problem in a way that attributed causality 
to a certain political party or group. “The chief of the local election committee himself closed the 
election district and deprived the voters to vote;” ”If the government wants public reaction, it 
will receive the public reaction;” “If the president was able to listen to your voices earlier, you 
would not be standing here now.” 
The conflict frame was defined as emphasizing disagreement or differences of opinion 
between the alliance For New Georgia and the opposition, and also within these opposing 
groups. Example: “Saakashvili doesn’t like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn’t like 
his radical tone;” “Disagreement within the positions of the members of party “For New 
Georgia” regarding the negotiations with opposition is obvious;” “We exhausted all resources 
and possibilities of agreement. The president is not willing to yield to his own people.”  
The economic consequences frame was defined as focusing on the financial aspects or impact it 
might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or the whole country. Example: “During 
these days, the economic index of the country became worse;” “The protests ruin the country’s 
economy.”  
The coding of content was conducted according to the procedures described by Riffe 
(1998). The author and a PhD student in mathematics coded the stories. They were the only two 
Georgian speakers at the university where the study was conducted. To ensure the accuracy of 
coding procedures and its results, the coders trained for a month. They coded 20 percent of the 
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stories together until consensus was reached, problems worked out, and categories refined. After 
reaching consensus, the coders coded separately the remainder of the stories. All categories were 
ratio measures, because the coders counted the number of times each category occurred. 
For calculating inter-coder reliability the researcher used Pearson correlations for interval 
data. The researcher counted the number of times something occurred. Pearson’s correlations 
were obtained as follows: supporters of the ruling party r = 1.0, p < .01; supporters of the 
reformers r = .88, p < .01; other sources in this category r = .91, p < .05; representatives of the 
ruling party conveying and supporting party statements r = .98, p < .01; representatives of the 
reformers conveying and supporting statements of the reformers and their allies r = .87, p < .01; 
ordinary citizens supporting the ruling party r = .84; p < .05; ordinary citizens supporting the 
reformers r = .93; p < .01;  the ruling party supporter political parties r = .88, p < .01;  the 
reformers supporter political parties r = 1.0, p < .01; p < .01;  political parties supporting neither 
of them or particular statements from both of them r = .86, p < .01; representatives of the central 
election committee supporting the ruling party r = 1.0; p < .01; representatives of the central 
election committee supporting the reformers r =; p <; manipulated people r = 1.0, p < .01; worthy 
people r = .87, p < .05; civil war/chaos/bloodshed r = .83, p < .01; peaceful protest r = .81, p < 
.01; motivation of coming into power r = .95, p < .05; fair battle r = 1.0; p < .01; fair 
elections/fair elections with minor violations r = .97, p < .01; falsified elections r = .95, p < .01; 
call for negotiation r = .94, p < .01; necessity of Shevardnadze’s resignation r = .98; p < .01; 
frame of responsibility r = .87, p < .01; conflict frame r = .95, p < .01; frame of economic 
subsequences r = .94, p < .01. Human-interest frame did not occur during the training process of 
the coder, so it was not coded during the actual coding. Because this study is primarily concerned 
with describing content rather than generalizing, data will be analyzed using percentages. 
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES 
Overall, there were 252 news stories covering Revolution of Roses in both state-owned 
and private-owned television companies. The independent television station aired 147 stories; the 
state-owned television station aired 105 stories.  Both television companies indexed their sources 
to representatives of political elite – Georgian government including the president and his party 
and opposition parties: 61 % of the state-owned television sources came from ruling party and 
reformers representatives; the independent television station had 75 % of ruling party and 
reformers representatives; (Table 1). Similarity of source categories are obvious, however there 
is a difference within the categories regarding supporters of each opposing parties. (Table 2). 
TABLE 1: Percentages of source categories (supporters of the ruling party as well as supporters 
of the reformers) in state-owned and independent station: 
Sources State-owned Station % Independent Station % 
Political Elite – Ruling Party and 
Reformers Representatives 
61 75 
Media, Foreign Countries’ 
Representatives, Local Experts and 
Celebrities  
34 38 
Representatives of Other Political 
Parties 
22 25 
Ordinary Citizens 19 18 
Representatives of Central Election 
Committee and its regional Branches 
12 15 
 
 
 31
  
TABLE 2: Percentages of sources within each category in state-owned and independent TV 
company:   
Ruling party supporters% Reformers supporters %  
Sources State-owned 
television % 
Independent  
Television % 
State-owned 
television % 
Independent 
television % 
Number of local 
celebrities and experts, 
foreign country’s 
representatives, media 
sources   
27 5 8 33 
Number of 
representatives of a) the 
ruling party and b) the 
reformers 
a) 48 a) 34 b) 13 b) 41 
Number of ordinary 
citizens 
15 3 4 22 
Number of other 
political parties 
19 12 3 7 
Number of 
representatives of 
central election 
committee 
11 9 1 7 
 Number of other 
sources 
5 3 1 1 
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This study also measured the statements by these sources aired by each television 
company. It found that 81% of the state-owned television station news stories had pro-
government key-words; Most frequent- 52 % - was a term framing the protests as a real danger 
of creating “civil war, bloodshed, destabilization or chaos” in the country; then came 
Shevardnadze’s “call for negotiations” to resolve the conflict – 44 %;  
On the independent TV company, 78 % of stories had anti-government key words. The 
most frequently used was the term falsification of elections/election lists – 56 % conveying the 
message that Georgian citizens were deprived of the right to vote; then followed “peaceful 
protest/will of Georgian people” – 49 %, stressing that the protests were expression of the 
people’s will and it was peaceful. (Table 3). 
TABLE 3: Percentages of pro-governmental and anti-governmental key-words in each 
TV Company: 
Pro-governmental key- 
words 
State  
% 
Indep. 
% 
Anti-governmental key-
words 
State 
% 
Indep. 
% 
Civil war, bloodshed, 
destabilization or chaos 
52 19 Falsification of 
elections/election lists 
21 56 
Call for negotiation 44 18 Peaceful protest/will of 
Georgian people 
16 49 
Fair elections with 
minor violations 
36 18 Fair battle 10 33 
Motivation of coming 
into power 
15 3 Call for resignation of 
president Shevardnadze 
6 26 
Manipulated people 9 3 Worthy people 11 19 
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State-owned and Independent television framed the Revolution of Roses differently. 
(Table 4). Overall, 61 % of news stories on both television stations quoted ruling party 
supporters, 55 %  supporters of the reformers. Only 29 % were sources not supporting any of the 
parties. 55 % of the stories aired pro-governmental key words and terms and 62 % were anti-
governmental key words. The least frequent frame in both news programs was the frame of 
economic consequences - 11 %.  
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS 
H1a: The prime-time stories in the news program of the state-owned television company 
had more sources from the representatives or/and supporters of the ruling party than the 
reformers.  
This hypothesis was supported. Seventy-five percent of the state television’s stories had 
sources from representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party; 26% of its stories had sources 
from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers.  
H1b: The prime-time stories in the news program of the private-owned television 
company had more sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers than from 
the ruling party. 
This hypothesis was supported. 75% of the private-owned television company’s stories 
contained sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the reformers; 52% of its stories 
used sources from the representatives and/or supporters of the ruling party. 
H2a: The state-owned television company used more pro-governmental keywords and 
terms than pro-reform keywords. 
This hypothesis was supported. The state-owned television used pro-governmental 
keywords and terms in 81% of its stories; 40% of its stories had pro-reformers key-words.  
H2b: The private-owned television company used more anti-governmental keywords than 
pro-government words.  
This hypothesis was supported. The private-owned television used anti-governmental key 
words in 78% of its stories; 38% of the stories had pro-governmental key-words.   
H3: The private-owned and state-owned TV channels framed the protest differently.   
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This hypothesis was supported. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the 
state-owned television was the responsibility frame; 73% of the state television stories were 
framed as issues of responsibility; 68% were conflict frames and 22% were frames of economic 
consequences. The most frequent frame of the protest coverage in the private owned television 
company was conflict - 88% of its stories contained this frame. The second most prevalent frame 
was the responsibility frame - 68% of the stories had this frame; and only 3% of the stories had 
frames of economic consequences. (Table 4). 
TABLE  4: Percentages of frames in state-owned and independent TV Company: 
Frames Independent television % State-owned television % 
Responsibility 68 73 
Conflict 88 68 
Economic consequences 3 30 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Both TV stations failed to provide a forum for the public discussion where all voices can 
participate without serious limitations. According to the indexing theory, they both indexed their 
coverage to the opinion of the political elite. Two major political groups were fighting with each 
other for power during the Revolution of Roses. The president and the ruling party “For the New 
Georgia” represented one group and the reformers and their parties - “National movement” and 
“Burjanadze – the Democrats” represented the other. Georgian state-owned and independent 
television companies quoted more frequently exactly these political groups: the president and 
representatives of his ruling party and the representatives of reformers. However, there were 
differences. In particular, state-owned television company had many more stories that quoted 
sources from the ruling party than the opposition and the private-owned television company had 
more stories that quoted sources from the opposition. Thus, each television company chose a 
different communication model with the president and his party. The state-owned television used 
the exchange model with the president of the country and its supporters, mainly the ruling party. 
The sources, in this case the president and his supporters, were providing the state-owned 
television’s journalists with desired material, often exclusives in exchange for access and 
favorable coverage. To the contrary, the independent television maintained the adversary model 
of relationships with the president and his party. Thus, both television companies, by choosing 
the different models of relationships with the president and his party, were presenting a polarized 
picture of reality.  
Despite their different approach to the protests both stations selected their news sources 
from a similar circle of political actors. However, they chose different representatives of these 
spheres: state-owned television, to strengthen the position of the ruling party, chose celebrities, 
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experts and media who supported the ruling party. The independent television, on the contrary, 
chose those sources that strengthened the position of the reformers. The difference was found in 
the frequency of those political parties which were not representing directly any of the 
conflicting sides: The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival Union, Ertoba. 
The state-owned television quoted representatives of these parties more frequently than the 
independent one. This has several explanations, both ideological and practical. The study found 
that sources included in this category and labeled as “other political parties” mainly made 
statements supporting the president and his party. So, ideologically, the state television repeated 
its main approach to protest coverage and chose to quote “other political parties” more often than 
the independent station did to strengthen the position of the ruling party. Independent television 
might have also has had a practical reason. This television company had problems with these 
sources because they were boycotting the independent television company, saying they were 
covering the protests in a way preferable to the reformers.   
Despite the obvious partisanship of the state and independent media, the independent 
television was somewhat more balanced in referring to the ruling party’s and reformers’ 
representatives: The state-owned television’s proportion of references to ruling party 
representatives and reformers representatives was consistently more skewed than independent 
television. For example, state TV referred to the ruling party 48 % of the time and reformers 13 
% of the time, while independent TV referred to the ruling party 34% of the time versus 41% 
references to reformers. The difference in selection of sources by independent television was not 
as great as by state-owned television. The difference might have been even less if the 
representatives of the ruling party and their supporters did not boycott the private-owned 
television company. The boycott became the reason that journalists of independent television 
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could not interview the ruling party representatives and their supporters. Political parties who 
were allies of the ruling party - The New Rights, Labor Party, Industry Saves Georgia, Revival 
Union – held a joint press conference on November 11 after the first week of the protest, and 
announced the boycott of independent television. They said the reason for the boycott was that 
the station had non-stop coverage of the protest that was a promotion of the event. Another 
reason for the boycott, they said, was that the station referred more often to the reformers and 
their supporters than to the opposing politicians. The ruling party representatives offered no 
official announcements of a boycott, but they were ignoring questions of journalists from the 
independent station at the briefings and press conferences. They also tried to get rid of their 
cameras when the independent station’s journalists attempted to interview them in front of their 
office, in the street, in the parliament building, etc.  
The indexing theory could explain this evidence. As the theory suggests, journalists need 
to quote authoritative sources. Such official sources in the government were the ruling party 
representatives, not the reformers. Also, the final resolution of the conflict depended more on the 
political will of the ruling party to admit that reformers won the elections. So the journalists and 
the public were interested in hearing their positions. Thus, the independent station looked for 
them and was eager to refer to them, while the state-owned television station did not have any 
“need” to quote the reformers, who were considered as organizers of disorder.    
The preferences and partisanship of each television station was more straightforward in 
selection of celebrities and experts: in state television the proportion of stories referring to the 
ruling party supporter celebrities was 27% and the reformer supporter celebrities was 8%; in 
independent television the same proportion was 5% ruling party supporters to 33% reform party 
supporters. The same trend of unbalanced sources is obvious in the rest of categories. (See table 
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2). The partisanship of these television stations was obvious also in usage of the key words and 
thematic clusters. (See Table 3). The key words expressing or strengthening the position or point 
of view of the government occurred more often in state-owned than independent television. Anti-
governmental key terms were more prevalent on the private-owned television company. 
Analyses of the key words and thematic clusters highlighted an important issue. The independent 
television organized its coverage of the Revolution of Roses around the reason of the protests 
being the falsification of elections. By stressing that elections were falsified and voters’ rights 
violated, the television station called citizens to mobilize and defend their rights. The protests 
became a representation of the will of the whole Georgian people. Thus, the meaning and 
importance of the protests were magnified and framed as a fair battle for justice. The state 
television station, on the contrary, was organizing its coverage around the protests itself. The 
news program was trying to discredit the protest by associating it with civil war, destabilization 
and chaos. But at the same time, the station was calling the opposition for negotiations. Stating 
that the protests were the result of the outcome of the elections was only the third most frequent 
key word. However, the elections were called fair and legitimate. This means that the 
independent station aimed at mobilization of citizens by emphasizing that elections were 
tampered with. The state television station, on the contrary, aimed at discrediting the revolution 
by saying that the elections were fair and the leaders of the protests were denying the election 
outcome only because they were motivated by the desire to gain power.  
  Shevardnadze and the ruling party, by framing the elections as “fair elections” and a 
protest as “gathering of manipulated people” attributed responsibility for the possible 
consequences to the reformers that led the protests. The responsibility frame was one of the most 
prevailing media frames in the state-owned television. According to the ruling party messages 
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that were repeated in the state television’s newscasts the protests would lead to “a civil war, 
bloodshed and chaos” in the country. The ruling party supporters said the reformers were 
“motivated to come to power” and did not respond to the president’s “call for negotiation” to 
resolve the conflict - the second most frequent frame on state television. In the opinion of the 
ruling party supporters, the reformers were facilitating the economic impediment of the country - 
the third most frequent frame on state television. The independent television station took a stand 
for reformers, even became active political partner of the reformers and supported democratic 
changes in the country by certain means. For example, the station neglected the frame of heavy 
economic consequences of the protests offered by the government and repeated on state 
television to prevent the spread of the protests. This frame was presented in only 2% of the 
stories on the independent station. Also the station emphasized the conflict - the most prevalent 
frame (88%) - between civil society and Shevardnadze’s government, which failed to 
acknowledge defeat in elections, and tried to remain in power. They did it by using such thematic 
clusters as: at the “peaceful protests” “worthy people” were expressing their “will” that 
“Shevardnadze’s government’s resignation was a necessity.” The station attributed the 
responsibility - the second most frequent frame occurring in 68% of the stories in independent 
television - for this conflict to the government, which “tampered with the elections” and 
“violated election rights” of the citizens.   
Thus the evidence shows that the state-owned television company favored the state 
position in every way – the number and kinds of sources, the frames and the key words. The 
private-owned television company did the opposite – favored the opposition by the same means: 
sources, frames and key words. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The study provides evidence that by framing elections and protests in a different way, 
political players and media professionals define and give different meanings to the same issues 
and suggest what is at issue. Thus each party of the political elite tried to promote their own 
political viewpoints. By preferring sources from the ruling party and their supporters and 
repeating frames and key words suggested by the ruling party, state television supported 
Shevardnadze and his party. To the contrary, by quoting more frequently reformers and their 
supporters and framing the event in a way offered by the reformers, the independent media 
supported the viewpoints of the reformers. Several reasons may explain why coverage of the 
event was so biased by these television companies. One of the reasons might be the normal 
journalistic routines within each medium. The state television throughout its history was facing 
the hegemony of the ruling party. In the Communist era it was the party, while in the 
independent era it was the president of the country. It became very difficult and even impossible 
to overcome its heavy heritage even during the turbulent period of large-scale protests. To 
overcome these problems, today, the new government of the country is reorganizing state 
television into a public broadcasting operation. Several groups in Georgian society, including 
non-governmental organizations, nominated candidates for public broadcasting’s board of 
supervisors. The parliament selected and appointed nine board members, who among other 
things were responsible for selecting the director of the public radio and Television Company, 
who has to be independent at least from the obvious influence of any political party. This 
election was crucial for the new public television, and old problems were still apparent. The 
board was unable to select a candidate in the first round because of in- fighting over candidates’ 
loyalties. The board members said that none of the short listed candidates had significant 
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experience in management of a big company. Lasha Bakradze, one of the candidates on the short 
list, said that the board was looking for the candidate who was loyal to the new government, in 
particular, the president and his National Movement party. In the second round, one of the most 
influential members of the new public television’s board, Tamar Kintsurashvili, was elected. 
Besides being a board member, she also is the close relative of Giga Bokeria, one of the leaders 
of the National Movement. Almost all of the candidates said that the new director of public 
television was not selected objectively and the ruling National Movement influenced and 
interfered in the process. Lia Mukhashavria, one of the candidates, even appealed to the courts, 
saying that it was illegal for the board to appoint as director one of its own members. Gia Nodia, 
a public TV board member, admitted that Kintsurashvili also does not have any significant 
experience in management, which was the reason given for denying the previous candidates. 
This happened under the new government led by the reformers, even though it looks like 
something one would expect from the previous government. Thus, it is hardly believable that the 
process of transformation of state television into public broadcasting will be successful. Nobody 
can insist that the public television will definitely be transformed into a medium free from the 
government’s pressure.  
From the day it was founded, the independent television station performed the function of 
watchdog of the government; because of this, it gained popularity in the country. During the 
protests the television company took it to extremes. The independent station became an active 
ally of the opposition while it was in the process of changing the existing government. The 
independent station was not an impartial information provider; it was as biased as state 
television.   
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It was essential for Georgia at that time to have a media that functioned as a watchdog. 
The reformers, local and international experts monitoring the elections, and citizens who were 
trying to participate in elections and make a difference in the country despite the obstacles such 
as insufficient election lists, were insisting that the election process was full of violations. 
(Khoperia, 2003; Shengelia, 2003). The experts had plenty of evidence of violations such as 
election reports that were fabricated so that it was easy for ordinary citizens to trace (Khoperia, 
2003).  Parallel vote count results and exit polls showed similar outcomes - the National 
Movement party won the elections (Report of Fair Elections, 2003). Yet the official government 
version was that the president and his party were the winners (Report of Central Election 
Committee, 2003). People who were ready to change the government peacefully put a lot of 
effort and energy into doing so, including standing in long lines on Election Day. Before the 
elections, they made sure they were on the lists of voters, and called the Central Election 
Committee and wrote requests if they were not on the lists (Shengelia, 2003; Khoperia, 2003). 
The turnout was heavy – 95% (Report of Central Election Committee, 2003; Report of Fair 
Elections, 2003). They did all this in hopes of ending the corruption in the country and 
improving living conditions while enjoying democracy and freedom. Instead, the president told 
them they were wrong. Their votes do not matter. The opinions of local and foreign experts do 
not matter. The only thing that matters is the will of the government to stay in power. In this 
case, as in case of the social movements in U.S., the media need to create the means for large-
scale communication, to take a more active, even participatory role to help reformers find their 
way to the public and help the public unite for justice, democracy and freedom. State television 
failed to fulfill this goal, while independent television took on the burden.  
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This participatory position of the independent station is applauded by developmental 
theory. The theory suggests that media in countries facing a transition from autocracy toward 
established democracy have to facilitate the promotion of democratic values and take a political 
stand to move the country toward democracy. In the case of Georgia, opposition and their 
supporters were considered to be democrats and eager to fulfill democratic reforms.  
The developmental theory has much in common also with Mindich’s (1998) position. In 
such a critical and fragile time for democracy as Georgia faced in November of 2003, a 
responsible journalist must offer something more than passive “objectivity.” (Mindich, 1998). A 
journalist should take a stand for civil rights, democracy and a country’s development by giving 
civic voices access to the public, to move the country toward the establishment of the values of 
democracy. Despite the fact that there were not many “citizen’s voices” in the coverage of the 
Revolution of Roses, and instead there were the voices of the opposing political elite, it was 
these politicians who were expressing the position of Georgia’s citizens. This became obvious 
during the protests, and afterwards, when the majority of Georgian citizens voted for the 
National Movement and Burjanadze the Democrats - the leaders of the revolution - and Mikheil 
Saakashvili was elected president in 2004. 
However, another way of looking at the problem is through the lens of Free Press Theory. 
Bias is against all professional norms of journalism, regardless of whether the bias is for the 
“right” or “wrong” side of the issue. A free press has to offer balanced, fair and objective 
accounts of the event or issue. Otherwise, it will not have the trust of the public, which is most 
valuable to a free press. One of the premises upon which the reforms in Georgia are founded is to 
gain more freedom of expression for everyone, using the Western press as a model. The 
coverage of the Revolution of Roses in the independent station was not conducive to the 
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development of a free press. It becomes even more obvious how important an unbiased press is 
now that the former reformers have become the government.  The independent television 
company not only abandoned its watchdog function, but became part of the government’s public 
relations machine by conveying mostly positive news about the policymakers and policies. So, 
after the former political opposition became the majority in the Government, the independent 
television continues symbiotic relationship with them. The state owned television also continues 
its regular routine – conveying the point of view of whoever is in the majority of the government. 
The government became more severe to free media. They are using well the obvious fact that the 
majority of Georgian journalists do not have that high standard of professionalism as their 
western counterparts have and the professional unions of journalists and other media 
representatives are very week. They attack the media whenever there is a story criticizing the 
government from the perspective of professionalism of the journalists. Their methods are more 
sophisticated then Shevardnadze’s methods were. Also they are well using public relation 
strategies for conveying convenient for them messages to public via media channels who support 
them. Looking from this perspective it would be interesting to elaborate and add to the existing 
field of media theory the new theory, which will well describe and explain the condition and 
development of media in countries in transition, such as Georgia is. In this country the current 
stage of media development is the mix of developmental and authoritative theories. 
For true facilitation of reforms and democracy, the media needs to be truly independent, 
fair and unbiased, providing the public with objective and sufficient information in order to give 
them the opportunity to reach informed and enlightened decisions upon which democracy is 
based. The present study gives evidence that both state-owned and independent media failed to 
do this during the Revolution of Roses.  
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Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
The present study cannot be generalized to Georgian media because it is limited to one 
particular event and only two television companies. For a better understanding of the journalistic 
routines of each television station a qualitative approach can be helpful. Particularly, interviews 
with the journalists as well as program managers and editors can better highlight communication 
strategies of each medium.  
The sample of television companies also can be broadened by researching the other two 
private commercial television stations in order to have a better understanding of how the 
Georgian media and television companies in particular covered the protests. 
Further research on the development of Georgian independent media after the Revolution 
of Roses can bring to light whether the Georgian independent media in general and not only 
during a crisis, is indeed able to maintain freedom from external restraints and achieve the 
freedom to facilitate universal values and general principles of democracy.  
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APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET 
Coder: 
Godi 1   nino 2 
 
News Program: 
Moambe 1  Kurieri 2 
 
Date 
 
Story ID 
 
SOURCES  
SUPPORTERS OF THE 
RULING PARTY 
SUPPORTERS OF 
REFORMERS 
Other 
Number of local celebrities and 
experts, foreign country’s 
representatives, media sources  
Number of local celebrities and 
experts, foreign country’s 
representatives, media sources  
Number of local celebrities and 
experts, foreign country’s 
representatives, media sources  
Number of representatives of the 
ruling party 
Number of representatives of the 
reformers 
Number of representatives of 
ruling party or reformers  
 
 
Number of ordinary citizens 
 
 
 
Number of ordinary citizens Number of ordinary citizens 
Number of other political parties 
 
Number of other political parties Number of other political parties 
Number of representatives of 
central election committee 
Number of representatives of 
central election committee 
Number of representatives of 
central election committee 
 
 
 Number of other sources 
 
 
 
Number of other sources Number of other sources 
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Key Words and Terms (count every time the key-word appears using the hash marks): 
PROGOVERNMENTAL ANTOGOVERNMENTAL 
Manipulated people 
 
 
Worthy People 
Destabilization/Civil 
war/bloodshed/chaos 
 
Peaceful protest/the will of Georgian 
people 
Motivation/will of coming into power 
 
 
Fair battle 
Fair elections with minor 
violations/transparent, democratic 
elections/fair elections ever since 
Shevardnadze 
 
 
Falsification of elections/violation of 
election rights/election lists 
Call for negotiation and agreement Necessity for government resignation 
Other 
 
 
Other 
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FRAMES (count existence of each using hash marks) 
 
 
NUMBER of responsibility frame 
 
 
NUMBER of conflict frame 
 
 
 
Number of economic subsequences 
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK 
Coder: Record your name.  
Story ID: record a number of the story within the news program. 
News program: record the name of the news program, where the story was aired.  
Date: record day, when the program was aired  
Sources:  
1. Local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media 
Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s 
representatives, media sources supporting ruling party  -record if a reporter used as a source local 
celebrities (artists, sportsmen, writers, example: Ramaz Chkhikvadze, Robert Sturua, Gia 
Bughadze, etc.) and experts (president’s advisors, economists, civil rights organizations, 
example: Gia Nodia, Ramaz Sakvarelidze, Tinatin Khidasheli, Zura Chiaberashvili, etc), foreign 
country’s representatives (Mission of European Union, any foreign observers, foreign country’s 
ambassadors, example: Richard Miles, etc.), media (any quoted newspaper, television station, 
magazine, online media, example: Guardian, CNN, NTV, etc.) supporting ruling party, making a 
statement that has positive evaluation of the elections and negative of the protests, that repeats or 
agrees with the statements of ruling party that elections were fair even with minor violations, 
president has situation under control, reformers and protests will cause destabilization and 
economic hindering of the country. (example: the head of EU Mission said that that elections 
took place, though there were some minor violations that did not effect the general outcome of 
the elections) 
2. Number of the representatives of local celebrities and experts, foreign country’s 
representatives, media sources supporting reformers -record if a reporter used as a source local 
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celebrities and experts, foreign country’s representatives, media sources supporting reformers, 
making a statement that has negative evaluation of the president’s and ruling party behavior and 
positive evaluation of the protests, repeats or agrees with the statements of reformers that the 
elections were violation of voters’ rights, the results did not express true will of people, citizens 
have to defend their rights by means of peaceful protests 
3. Number of other sources – record the number of local celebrities and experts, foreign 
country’s representatives, media sources, not supporting any of opposing parties’ viewpoints, 
blaming them both or agrees with certain claims from both parties’ statements (example: Sturua 
saying that we must avoid bloodshed) 
Self:  
1. Number of the representatives of the bloc “For New Georgia” supporting the ruling 
party - Record the number of sources from the bloc “For New Georgia” (President 
Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Jorbenadze, active representatives: Sarishvili, Mamaladze, 
Xazaradze, etc.) making statements against the reformers and their supporters and expressing the 
point of view of the ruling party  
2. Number of the representatives of the reformers supporting reformers - record the 
number of sources from the representatives of reformers (Saakashvili, Burjanadze, Jvania, 
Davitashvili, etc.) expressing point of view of their party and allies, making statements about 
falsification of elections and against the ruling party or their allies. 
3. Number of other sources – record if the story has sources from the ruling or 
reformer’s parties who do not support the view point of their parties or their allies and support 
certain claims from both of them or criticizing both of them (mostly such claims come from the 
representatives of ruling party, Nadareishvili, Karkarashvili, etc. especially on the second week 
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(9-16 November) of protests, when Shevardnadze calls for negotiation. Example: Both sides 
should compromise, government have to find a common language with the protesters.) 
Ordinary citizens 
1. Number of ordinary citizens supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record if the 
reporter refers to ordinary citizens (ordinary citizens, who do not represent any party or 
institution, students, etc.) as a source who demonstrate their support for New Georgia, saying 
they had not any problems during voting, elections were fair and they support Shevardnadze and 
are against the protests 
2. Number of the representatives of ordinary citizens supporting the reformers - record if 
the reporter refers to people (participants of demonstrations, ordinary citizens, students) as a 
source who claimed that their rights were violated and their voice was lost during unfair 
elections, they support reformers or are against the ruling party 
3. Number of other sources - record the number of citizens, not supporting any of 
opposing parties’ viewpoints, supporting certain claims from both of them, criticizing both of 
them, talking about other than election or protest issues (example: No, I don’t want civil war; 
Zugdidi made fair choice; etc.) 
Representative of any other political party 
1. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the bloc “For New 
Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New 
Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make 
statements in favor of ruling party, saying that exit polls don’t express everything, reformers 
were part of the ruling party before who fabricated elections. Example: (Davit Gamkrelidze – 
These elections were fair in comparison of fabrication of elections before by the reformers.)  
 57
  
  2. Number of the representatives of other political parties supporting the reformers - 
Record the number of representatives of other oppositional parties such as New Rights, Labor 
Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity (Ertoba), who make statements in favor 
of reformers and protests and again the ruling party and Schevardnadze 
3. Number of other sources - Record the number of representatives of other oppositional 
parties such as New Rights, Labor Party, Revival Union, Industry will save Georgia, Unity 
(Ertoba), who support certain claims of both parties or criticizing both of them (Natelashvili 
saying that ruling party and reformers both are the same party now split for power and 
parliamentary seats) 
Representative of Central Election Committee 
1. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the bloc “For 
New Georgia” - Record the number of representatives of the Central Election Committee or its 
local representatives who say, elections were fair and representative, though with minor 
violations, or make any claim in favor of the ruling party and against reformers and protests 
(Devdariani – the protesters are trying to influence us, but I can’t write the outcomes of the 
elections as they want me to write them) 
2. Number of the representatives of central election committee supporting the reformers 
- Record the number of representatives of the Central election committee or its local 
representatives who say, elections were unfair and under-representative, give examples of 
falsification, etc. make any statement in favor of the reformers (mostly these are representatives 
of national movement party and the democrats in the election committee) 
3. Number of other sources – record if the representatives of central election committee 
or its branches support certain claims from both of the parties or criticize both of them 
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Other sources  
  1. Number of other sources supporting the bloc “For New Georgia” - record the number 
of any other source that not match the above categories who claims support of the bloc For New 
Georgia and said elections were fair and the protesters will cause destabilization (most often 
these are representatives of executive branch – gamgebeli, meri, etc.) example: Zugdidi is quiet, 
reformers could not make citizens to come out into the streets and join the protests 
2. Number of the representatives of other sources supporting the reformers - record the 
number of any other source that not matched the above categories who claims support of the 
reformers and said elections were unfair 
3. Number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories – 
record the number of other sources not falling into any of above-mentioned categories  
Key words: count the number of key words and key terms using hash marks: /////////// 
Key words and key terms indicate either pro-governmental or anti governmental position.  
Pro-Government key terms:  
1) “Manipulated people” - this term is often used for blaming certain politicians for 
imanipulating public to protest government, using public to achieve their political ends and 
therefore emphasizing the weakness of public opinion. Example: “A bunch of manipulated 
people is gathering in front of the Parliament.” 
2) “Civil war/bloodshed/destabilization/chaos” – the term is used to identify 
demonstrations and public gatherings as a reason for future civil war and bloodshed. Those 
opposed to government politicians are blamed for splitting the Georgian public into two 
adversary groups that will defend themselves by means of arms and thus bloodshed will be 
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inevitable. Example: “in 1992 we experienced what this kind of destabilization causes. We don’t 
want one more civil war, one more bloodshed.” 
3) “Motivation/will of coming into power” - it was said that the only reason 
oppositional politicians were opposing the government and the results of the election was their 
motivation to come into power. Example: “Jvania is opposing the official results of the 2nd 
November, because he wants to come to power. Unlike the results of exit polls ordered by him, 
the results of the Central Election Committee show it is possible that he will stay out of the 
Parliament.” 
4) “Fair elections with minor violations/transparent, democratic elections” - 
Governmental sources were claiming that overall the elections were fair, but had some minor 
violations that did not affect the final outcome.  Example: “Despite the minor violations, in 
whole, the 2nd November elections were the most fair elections of the past years.” 
5) Call for negotiation and agreement - the president often stresses that he was eager to 
meet the organizers of the protests and calls for negotiations. By doing so, he stresses that despite 
his efforts the opposition was radical and unwilling to start the dialogue. Example: “I was 
waiting for Jvania, Burjanadze and others yesterday. They promised to come, but did not show 
up.” 
6) Other: record the number of any keyword or term that did not matched the above-
mentioned categories. 
Anti-government keywords: 
1) Worthy people: Record the number of times when people taking part in 
demonstrations were called worthy people who came out into the streets to defend their dignity, 
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and their dignity was defined as the right to vote. Example: “Georgians are worthy people. They 
won’t let the government  ignore their choice.”  
2) The will of Georgian people/peaceful protest - record the number of times when the 
statements that manifestations and demonstrations against the government were defined as a will 
of people to defend their rights. Example: “The Government is neglecting the will of Georgian 
people, who are standing in front of the Parliament, despite the rain, wind and cold, to defend 
their voice.”  
Record the number of times when the protests were defined as a peaceful way of 
changing the government. Oppositional forces, claiming that people thought it was possible to 
change the government peacefully  by voting, often used this term. Government took this 
possibility from people by falsification of elections. Now people were trying to reinstate justice. 
Example: “Join us in a peaceful protest, in a peaceful way of replacing the existing government.” 
3) Fair battle: record the number of times when demonstrations were defined as a fair 
battle for defense of  the right to vote and to fair elections. Example: “This is a fair battle to 
defend our voices.” 
4) Falsification of elections/ election lists/violation of voter’s rights: record the 
number of times when source was claiming that elections were dramatically falsified. Example: 
“It is evident that the results of the elections are totally fabricated in order to falsify the 
elections.” Record if the source was claiming that government violated the right of vote. 
Example: “Shevardnadze violated the election rights of the voter, he took away our voices and 
by doing so, his party obtained the first place.” 
5) Call for resignation of the president: record the number of times when any of the 
sources said it was time for the president’s resignation. Example: “The president can’t hear our 
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voices any more. He can’t rule the country according to the needs of its own citizen’s. The 
president has to resign.” Include also the scan of protesting people. Example: “Retire! Retire!” or 
“Go away!”  
6) Other: record the number of times when there was any other key word or term that 
was in favor of protesters and against the government. 
Frames (count existence of each) 
Besides the key words and key terms, the context of a particular broadcast story might 
indicate a certain frame. Therefore, the unit of analysis should be each story. Select one of the 
following categories: responsibility frame, conflict frame, economic consequences frame or  
human-interest frame. 
Responsibility frame: Places blame or attributes cause. Portrays an issue or problem in a 
way that attributes responsibility for its cause to government, individuals, or interest groups. 
Example for the responsibility frame: “The chief of the local election committee himself closed 
the election district and deprived the voters their right to vote.” 
Conflict frame: stresses conflict or disagreement between individuals, institutions or 
different groups and the government, in order to capture more audience interest. Example for the 
conflict frame: “Saakashvili doesn’t like the methods of Burjanadze. Burjanadze doesn’t like his 
radical tone.” 
Economic consequences frame: pictures an event, problem or issue focusing on the 
economic impact it might have on an individual, group, institution, region, or country. Example 
for the economic consequences frame: “During these days, the economic index of the country 
became worse.”   
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